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T he human body enjoys a special place in the law. Many of our most basic rights as citizens, including the right to be free from unreasonable search and sei-zures, the right to be free from physical assaults by 
others, and the right to privacy, arise from the idea that we 
should be able to control what happens to our own bodies. This 
principle of the inviolable body is also the basis for preventing 
individuals from utilizing their body or body parts in the eco-
nomic marketplace and gives rise to legislation such as the pro-
hibition on the sale of organs, the invalidation of surrogacy con-
tracts, and the criminalization of prostitution. In the book, 
Whose Body Is It Anyway: Justice and the Integrity of the Per-
son, Cécile Fabre posits that the current legal system would be 
more just if we disavowed ourselves of this principle of the in-
violable body, or the idea that the body is legally special, and 
instead accepted a legal system in which we all have a right to 
each other’s bodies, including our own. She points out that, 
“justice requires conferring on the sick a right to the organs of 
the dead and, in some cases, the living; and…requires conferring 
on individuals a right to buy and sell organs, sex, and reproduc-
tive services.” 
 
Fabre admits at the outset of the book that because the prin-
ciples she advances may disturb our traditional doctrines and 
principle, she expects little popular support. However, despite 
my initial distress with an argument that asserts I should not 
have the right to decide what happens to my own body, I eventu-
ally found that the text raised interesting questions about the 
contradictions inherent in our legal system’s treatment of the 
physical body. As Fabre aptly notes, “our legal and political 
tradition is such that we have the right to deny others access to 
our person, even though doing so would harm those who need 
such access; however, we lack the right to use ourselves as we 
wish in order to raise income, even though we do not necessarily 
harm other by doing so...” After reading her book, I found my-
self agreeing with these inconsistencies under our legal system; 
while the law tells us that we have complete control over our 
physical persons, we are in reality legally barred from selling 
our organs or sexual services, even if doing so causes no harm to 
others and, in the case of organ sales, even helps those in great 
need. 
 
To advance her argument, Fabre relies on the fundamental 
soundness of the principle of distributive justice, which states 
that some redistribution of wealth or resources across society is 
necessary in order to achieve justice for all. She points to exam-
ples from western society, such as the prevalence of social pro-
grams like welfare and the redistribution of wealth through taxa-
tion, to illustrate that the principle of distributive justice is al-
ready generally accepted.  Fabre does not argue that it is neces-
sary to have a wholesale redistribution of resources in which 
every member of society is given resources in exactly equal 
amounts. Instead, she works from a framework that stipulates 
only that each individual has a right to the resources he or she 
requires in order to live a “minimally flourishing life,” and pur-
sue a “conception of the good.”  Fabre argues that the natural 
consequence of meeting these basic goals is allowing those in 
need, a right to the material resources, including the body, of 
other members of society. Without these resources, many people 
are unable to live a minimally flourishing life, or even any life at 
all. 
 
After asserting that the principles of distributive justice dic-
tate that members of society have a right to the bodies of others, 
Fabre then explains how the “redistribution” of bodily resources 
would be accomplished. In chapters 3 through 8, respectively, 
Fabre advocates for the creation of a mandatory civilian service, 
the confiscation of organs from both cadavers and living people, 
and the legalization of the sale of organs, prostitution, and surro-
gacy contracts. 
 
The arguments I found most compelling were those con-
tained within Fabre’s thesis as it relates to the confiscation of 
organs. Fabre attempts to convince the reader that many of the 
arguments in favor of absolute bodily autonomy are both mis-
guided and unjust. First, she claims that, compared to another 
individual’s right to live a minimally flourishing life, or in many 
cases to live at all, a right to absolute bodily integrity seems 
weak. Moreover, Fabre argues that the confiscation of organs 
does not deny bodily autonomy, but instead places on it a quali-
fication that the redistribution of organs should occur when indi-
viduals are impaired in their ability to lead a minimally flourish-
ing life.  She does allow those with true conscientious objections 
the option to refuse to give their organs to those in need; an ab-
solute requirement that would violate an individual’s conscience 
would also harm his or her ability to realize the “conception of 
the good.”  By allowing for these conscientious objections, 
Fabre addresses the only strong argument against instituting an 
organ confiscations system. Further, these allowances give her 
argument internal consistency because they reveal she is equally 
concerned that all members of society are able to live and pursue 
their own ideals.  
 
While I was tempted to agree with Fabre’s oral arguments 
in favor of an organ confiscation of the system.  I failed to find 
her chapter regarding the legalization of prostitution persuasive. 
Her defense of prostitution is especially relevant to current dis-
cussions in the feminist community, who questions power differ-
entials, gender equality and the commodification of women’s 
bodies in the marketplace. Fabre acknowledges these issues exist 
but ultimately argues that the legalization and regulation of the 
sex industry would shield women from the harm they might oth-
erwise face for supplying such services on the black market. 
Unlike the more persuasive moral arguments Fabre makes for 
practices such as organ confiscation, she never reaches a similar 
conclusion that the legalization of prostitution is moral or just in 
its own right.  Instead, Fabre concludes that the problem with 
prostitution is not the act of providing sexual services for money 
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admits that the vast majority of women would not choose to 
prostitute themselves if they had access to other economic op-
portunities. Thus, her position that an absolute right to prostitute 
oneself is required in the interest of justice, is not persuasive. 
 
In the end, Whose Body Is It Anyway? is best read as a phi-
losophical text, and not a practical guide to possible changes in 
the legal treatment of the body.  Although it sheds light onto 
contradictory aspects of both the application of distributive jus-
tice and the sacrosanct treatment of the human body in the legal 
system, it is neither an “endeavour in social policy,” nor a “party 
manifesto.”  Additionally, due to both Fabre’s writing style and 
the often dense and complicated philosophical ideas she relies 
on to make her arguments, the book is neither an easy nor a 
quick read, especially for anyone who does not have a back-
ground in philosophy. However, what is effective about her 
book is that it both provokes and engages the reader by challeng-
ing us to reexamine one of our most basic ideas - that our bodies 
should belong solely to ourselves. 
ENDNOTES 
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